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The End of a Two-State Settlement? 
Alternatives and Priorities for Settling the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
Muriel Asseburg and Jan Busse 
On the occasion of their joint government consultations in February 2016, Prime Minis-
ter Benjamin Netanyahu and Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed that this was not the 
time for making major progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, given the in-
stability in the Middle East. However, merely adhering to a two-state settlement as a 
mantra without taking any concrete steps to implement it effectively reinforces the 
one-state reality under Israeli dominance. Ultimately, this will make settling the con-
flict impossible. Popular support for a two-state solution is waning on both sides. While 
at present alternative one-state or confederate models have even slimmer chances of 
being realized, Germany and the EU should nevertheless explore the creative and con-
structive aspects of these models, which would enable the two sides to maintain their 
national identities as well as realize their individual and collective rights. Their priority, 
however, should be to alter the cost-benefit calculation of the parties to the conflict, so 
as to generate the political will for bringing about a settlement at all. 
 
Since the 1947 UN partition resolution, 
large parts of the international community 
as well as the most important representa-
tives of the parties to the conflict and their 
populations have come to adopt the two-
state paradigm as their preferred option 
for lastingly settling the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. The UN Security Council explicitly 
confirmed this approach in its Resolution 
1397 of March 2002. 
The cornerstones of a two-state settle-
ment have long been defined. US President 
Barack Obama formulated them in his first 
speech to the UN General Assembly in Sep-
tember 2009; the E3 (Germany, France, 
United Kingdom) presented them to the UN 
Security Council in February 2011. They 
comprise a territorial settlement on the 
basis of the 1967 borders, with agreed land 
swaps; security arrangements that take into 
account the needs of both sides; a solution 
to the refugee issue that is both just and 
acceptable to the conflict parties and the 
main host nations; and Jerusalem as the 
capital of both states. The 1993 Israeli-Pales-
tinian Declaration of Principles (or Oslo I) 
were a decisive step in that the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) formally 
recognized the State of Israel. In turn, Israel 
formally recognized not a Palestinian state, 
but at least the PLO – and thus the Pales-
tinians’ right to self-determination. Since 
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then, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and 
unofficial talks have worked out detailed 
approaches for settling all areas of conflict. 
Yet today, the positions of the parties are 
far apart on all final-status issues – notice-
ably further apart than in previous nego-
tiations. Under international pressure, 
Prime Minister Netanyahu did commit in 
principle to a two-state solution in a 2009 
speech at Bar Ilan University. In his 2015 
electoral campaign, however, he explicitly 
promised his voters that no Palestinian 
State would be created during his mandate. 
His government has yet to commit itself 
to a two-state approach; several ministers 
reject it explicitly and demand Israeli sover-
eignty over at least parts of the occupied 
Palestinian territories. They put forward 
not only security reasons, but also histori-
cally and religiously based claims to “Judea 
and Samaria”. 
By contrast, the leadership in Ramallah 
has adhered to its quest for Palestinian 
statehood and the two-state approach. 
Whenever Palestinian politicians have re-
ferred to dissolving the Palestinian Author-
ity (PA) and instead campaigning for equal 
citizens’ rights in one state, should no 
progress be made in the peace process, this 
has merely been a threatening gesture. 
Even so, like their Israeli counterparts, they 
no longer expect bilateral negotiations to 
lead to an acceptable conflict settlement. 
Both conflict parties therefore rely first and 
foremost on unilateral steps to realize their 
respective interests and only maintain a 
minimum level of cooperation in managing 
the conflict. 
Consolidation of a one-state reality 
Meanwhile, a one-state reality has long taken 
shape in the area of the former British 
Mandate of Palestine (for details see SWP 
Comments 21/2014). Israel might only have 
annexed a part of the Palestinian territories 
that it occupies – East Jerusalem – but it 
also has extensive control over the rest. The 
foundations for this situation were laid in 
the Oslo Accords of 1993 to 1995, despite 
the fact that these were only meant to be 
valid for a five-year interim period leading 
to an independent Palestinian State. The 
Accords essentially limit the PA to self-
adminsitration and keeping internal order 
in the largely unconnected Areas A and B 
(enclaves totalling around 38 percent of 
the West Bank). Since the Second Intifada, 
Israel has also reserved the right to carry 
out its own military operations and arrests 
in Area A. In Area C of the West Bank 
(around 62 percent), the Accords provide 
for extensive Israeli control over security; 
civil order; and construction as well as 
land and resource use (see also the map in 
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas 2015, http:// 
www.ochaopt.org/documents/atlas_2015_ 
web.pdf, p. 4). At the same time, the Oslo 
Accords give Israel control over the Pales-
tinian territories’ air space and sea and land 
borders during the interim period. This is 
still the case today. Israel only gave up 
control over the border between the Gaza 
Strip and Egypt in mid-2007. Last but not 
least, the Oslo Accords cemented Israel’s 
dominance over Jerusalem and the Pales-
tinian economy, especially trade, currency 
and access to resources. 
Moreover, throughout the Oslo process 
all Israeli governments – regardless of their 
political affiliations – forged ahead with 
building settlements in the Palestinian ter-
ritories. In summer 2005, the Sharon gov-
ernment only evacuated the settlements in 
the resource-poor and ideologically insig-
nificant Gaza Strip – which is not consid-
ered part of the historic homeland of the 
Jewish people. As a result, around 350,000 
settlers now live in about 125 settlements 
among some 2.89 million Palestinians in 
the West Bank. In East Jerusalem, there are 
some 200,000 settlers in 12 settlements. An 
additional 10,000 settlers live in about 100 
outposts. These are illegal under Israeli law 
as well, but they are increasingly legalized 
retroactively, removed only temporarily, 
or else rebuilt on a different site after being 
removed. 
A complex system has thus evolved be-
tween the Mediterranean Sea and the river 
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Jordan, under which inhabitants enjoy – or 
are deprived of – different rights depending 
on their citizenship, place of residence 
(Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusa-
lem) and ethno-religious identity. Today, 
the area controlled by Israel no longer has a 
Jewish majority. Of the around 12.6 million 
people living there, around 6.2 million are 
Jews and 6.3 million Arabs (Palestinians and 
other Arab minorities). In the coming years, 
demographics are likely to change further 
in favour of the Arab share, especially as 
large waves of Jewish immigration, as were 
seen in the 1980s and 1990s, are not to be 
expected. 
Waning support 
A two-state settlement is becoming increas-
ingly unlikely. The financial and political 
costs of implementing it rise with every 
settlement unit needing to be demolished 
and with every settler needing to be evacu-
ated and compensated. At the same time, 
the occupation and the construction of 
settlements are increasingly fragmenting 
the Palestinian territories – and thus the 
territory that would be available for a Pales-
tinian state. Other factors contribute to the 
problem: the construction of settlement 
infrastructure and the separation barrier; 
the isolation of East Jerusalem and the 
blockade of the Gaza Strip; and a complex 
system of checkpoints, separated streets 
and permits. In addition, the split between 
Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in the 
Gaza Strip, which has led to the creation of 
two government and security apparatuses 
and two legal systems, is endangering the 
creation of one single Palestinian state. 
As a result, populations in Israel and 
the Palestinian areas have increasingly 
abandoned the two-state approach. While 
this formula enjoyed majority support 
among both the Israeli and Palestinian 
populations in polls from the mid-2000s 
onwards, support has noticeably waned in 
both societies since then. According to the 
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey 
Research (PCPSR), in December 2014 a two-
state settlement was rejected by a majority 
(51 percent) of the Palestinians surveyed for 
the first time. By December 2015, the rejec-
tion rate had reached 54 percent. In addi-
tion, two-thirds of those surveyed no longer 
thought the approach viable because of 
settlement construction. The same trend 
has been shown among the Israeli popula-
tion. According to a poll by the Harry S. 
Truman Institute of the Hebrew University 
in Jerusalem, support in Israel for a two-
state settlement stood at 51 percent in June 
2015. A year earlier, it had been at 62 per-
cent. Clearly, many Israelis share the assess-
ment that a two-state settlement is no 
longer realistic. They also do not expect it 
to bring about peace. 
In both societies, frustration over the 
failure of the peace process is also accom-
panied by seeing one’s own side (only) as a 
victim, by demonizing the other side, by 
becoming increasingly radical and by en-
dorsing violence. This finds expression in 
concrete acts of violence, such as the (knife) 
attacks by Palestinian perpetrators and the 
so-called price-tag attacks by Israeli settlers 
(attacks meant to signal that measures run-
ning contrary to settler interests have a 
price). Around 30 Israelis and 150 Palestin-
ians have died in the latest escalation of 
violence from October 2015 to the end of 
March 2016. Even though this escalation – 
described by many observers as a “third 
intifada” – has so far not assumed the shape 
of an organized uprising, the lack of a 
political horizon (US-mediated talks broke 
down in April 2014) is jeopardising the con-
flict management agreed upon in Oslo. 
Radicalisation has been acompanied by 
an erosion of democratic values. According 
to the Israel Democracy Institute, in 2015 a 
quarter of the Jewish Israelis polled rejected 
equal rights for non-Jewish Israelis. Almost 
40 percent saw a strong leader who was not 
subject to democratic controls as the solu-
tion to Israel’s problems. In the Palestinian 
territories, the decreasing popularity of the 
leaderships in both Gaza and Ramallah (not 
least because of the lack of progress made 
in ending the occupation) has prompted 
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further restrictions on political freedoms. 
In any case, the Palestinian political system 
is democratic in name only (even if one dis-
counts the occupation). At the same time, 
an opinion poll carried out by PCPSR in 
September 2015 found that the creation 
of a democratic political order was the top 
priority for only 9 percent of Palestinians. 
They attached more importance to ending 
the occupation (48 percent); realizing the 
right of return (30 percent); and Islamizing 
society (13 percent). Fuelled by the conflict, 
the domestic political developments in 
both polities thus also run contrary to the 
international expectation that a two-state 
approach would lead to the creation of two 
democratic states. 
On both sides, confrontational methods 
of conducting the conflict (violence, boy-
cott, legal recourse, internationalisation 
vs. military approaches, settlement drive, 
collective punishment, sealing-off and 
blockade) are increasingly seen as having 
no alternative. Moreover, the Israeli opposi-
tion offers no credible alternatives that 
might lead to a two-state settlement. Oppo-
sition leader Isaac Herzog’s plan for sepa-
ration from the Palestinians, which he 
presented in early 2016, stems from the 
same siege mentality as Netanyahu’s 
policies. As a consequence, there is a risk 
not only of a renewed confrontation between 
Israel and the Gaza Strip, which is likely to 
be even more violent and destructive than 
the last one, but also of a further erosion or 
even collapse of the PA caused by an escala-
tion of the current violence into an armed 
uprising, a worsening of the PA’s financial 
crisis, or violent Palestinian infighting 
for the succession to President Abbas (born 
1935). 
Alternatives to the two-state model 
In light of the growing doubts about the 
viability of a two-state settlement, both 
the Israeli and the Palestinian side have in 
the past few years developed alternative 
approaches to dealing with the conflict. 
These include one-state models that provide 
for Jewish dominance, proposals for a bi-
national state, and concepts for a confeder-
ation of two independent states. 
A Jewish-dominated state 
In Israel, supporters of a one-state approach 
can especially be found on the right of 
the political spectrum. Its supporters claim 
ownership of the West Bank for religious-
ideological motives. For instance, the for-
mer foreign and defence minister Moshe 
Arens and President Reuven Rivlin (both 
Likud) reject a two-state settlement and in-
stead promote annexing the West Bank and 
granting its Palestinian population civil 
rights. 
Naftali Bennett, the leader of the ex-
treme-right settler party The Jewish Home, 
education minister and member of the 
security cabinet, likewise rejects a Palestin-
ian State. In his “Stability Plan” presented 
in 2012, he advocates the unilateral annexa-
tion of the West Bank’s Area C and the 
Israeli settlements. The Palestinians living 
in Area C would receive full civil rights in 
Israel. Bennett’s plan, however, not only 
seriously underestimates the number of 
Palestinians concerned – he puts them 
at 50,000 while the UN’s 2014 estimate is 
300,000 – it also grants the Palestinian 
populations of Areas A and B only autono-
mous self-administration. 
These and similar proposals for settling 
the conflict that emanate from the Israeli 
right thus represent a formalisation of the 
one-state reality. They stipulate keeping 
different sets of rights – albeit to varying 
degrees – including preferential treatment 
for Jews over Palestinians. They reject Pales-
tinian statehood on principle. Palestinians 
in the annexed areas would be granted 
Israeli citizenship and individual civil rights, 
but as a collective, they would have only 
limited political rights. In other words, this 
approach aims not at a binational state, but 
at a Jewish-dominated one-state model, in 
which Israeli sovereignty would be formally 
extended to parts of the occupied territo-
ries. It is also striking that these proposals 
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explicitly or implicitly exclude the Gaza 
Strip. For only without the Gaza population 
(of around 1.85 million at the end of 2015, 
according to the Palestinian Central Bureau 
of Statistics) would it be possible to main-
tain a demographic Jewish majority in such 
a state in the medium term. In the same 
vein, such proposals also categorically ex-
clude the right of return for Palestinian 
refugees. 
A democratic binational state 
Alongside these ideas, there are proposals 
for a one-state settlement, or for a binational 
state, that stipulate the same rights for 
Israelis and Palestinians. Except for the in-
ternational contributions to the debate, 
these proposals stem from a relatively small 
minority of post-Zionist Israelis. For in-
stance, the former Labour Party politician 
and speaker of the Knesset, Avraham Burg, 
sees the low probability of a two-state settle-
ment as an opportunity for promoting a 
state based on equality, justice and freedom 
for Israelis and Palestinians. For the Israeli 
historian Ilan Pappé, such a one-state for-
mula represents the only possibility of end-
ing the discrimination against the Pales-
tinian population of Israel and the Israeli 
occupation, and of enabling Palestinian 
refugees to return to their homeland. 
The Israeli sociologist Yehouda Shenhav 
has also argued in favour of a one-state 
approach. For him, the main problem with 
a two-state settlement is that in focusing 
on the occupation that started in 1967, it 
neglects the injustices committed in and 
resulting from the 1948 war. Moreover, the 
eviction of settlers would create new in-
justices. He therefore supports a consocia-
tional democratic system within a single 
state. A central element of the political 
order would be a joint Israeli-Palestinian 
constitutional court. 
Additionally, ever more Palestinian 
intellectuals and activists – in contrast to 
the nationalist factions of the PLO – are 
taking a stance for a one-state settlement. 
For instance, Edward Said, the literary 
theorist who decisively marked the inter-
national debate on Palestine before his 
death in 2003, argued as early as 1999 for 
the creation of a binational state as an 
alternative to the Oslo peace process. He 
underlined the multiple interdependencies 
between the two sides, making partition 
practically impossible; and he did not think 
that it was viable to assert Palestinian na-
tional self-determination in a separate state 
because of Israeli claims to the territory. 
Instead, he considered equal civil rights for 
Israelis and Palestinians to be the decisive 
foundation for an effective coexistence in 
one state. 
In 2011, the Palestinian philosopher Sari 
Nusseibeh – the PLO’s former representa-
tive in East Jerusalem, long-standing Presi-
dent of Al Quds University there, and long-
time supporter of a two-state settlement – 
argued in favour of an Israeli annexation of 
the occupied territories, in what was a pro-
vocative thought experiment for Palestin-
ian society. In his scenario, Palestinians 
would initially be second-class citizens with 
civil but not political rights; establishing 
full civil rights in one state would, for Nus-
seibeh, significantly improve their living 
conditions compared to life under occu-
pation. The Palestinian academic and 
activist Ghada Karmi advocates a one-state 
approach for different reasons. She con-
siders the quest for Palestinian statehood a 
delusion, and therefore backs the struggle 
for equal rights, not least to lay bare the 
injustices of the occupation. 
In his 2006 book One Country, the Pales-
tinian-American journalist and activist Ali 
Abunimah suggests a one-state solution 
based on eight principles: equal treatment 
for all male and female citizens and respect 
for civil, political, social and cultural rights; 
the founding of a union of two national 
communities with equal rights; preserving 
the linguistic and cultural traditions of 
both nations; religious freedom and neu-
trality of the state towards religious com-
munities; accepting forms of inclusive iden-
tity that transcend the borders of national 
communities and overcome identities that 
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are based on rejecting the other side; 
recognising special relationships with the 
respective diaspora communities; giving 
the state special responsibility for protect-
ing the holy sites of the three monotheistic 
world religions and guaranteeing access to 
them; promoting economic opportunities, 
social justice and a dignified life for all 
citizens as well as reparations for victims 
of earlier injustices. 
Whilst the above proposals for a one-
state settlement differ in the details, they 
share a number of characteristics: In par-
ticular, they provide for a binational, 
democratic and secular state for Israelis 
and Palestinians, in which both collective 
and minority rights enjoy effective protec-
tion. They thus fundamentally differ from 
such one-state approaches as promoted, for 
instance, by Hamas in its charter, where 
the whole country is considered an “Islamic 
endowment” (waqf) that God has entrusted 
to Muslims. While Jews would be allowed to 
live in it as well, they would neither have 
equal status nor collective political rights. 
It is interesting to note that in the past 
decade Hamas has taken a pragmatic turn 
towards the two-state paradigm and de-
facto coexistence with Israel. 
Confederate models 
There are, however, also innovative ap-
proaches that go beyond a one- or two-state 
approach. In this context, confederate 
models are of particular relevance. In 2004 
the Israeli anthropologist and human-
rights activist Jeff Halper proposed a two-
step plan for solving the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. His approach is based on the reali-
sation that the conflict’s core problems can 
only be solved on the regional level. First, 
he suggests creating a viable sovereign 
Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 
borders. Then a regional confederation 
consisting of Israel, Palestine and Jordan (as 
well as Syria, Lebanon and possibly other 
states such as Egypt in the long-term) would 
be established. Laws concerning the whole 
“Middle East Union” would be passed by a 
confederate parliament, which would have 
to take into account the individual rights 
of citizens of the Union, regardless of where 
they live. To solve the refugee issue, Halper 
suggests giving the Palestinian population 
the possibility of choosing within the frame-
work of the Union whether they want to 
acquire Palestinian citizenship or the citi-
zenship of their host country. Within the 
Union there would be freedom of move-
ment, residence and employment. In this 
scenario, Palestinian refugees could return 
to Israel without receiving Israeli citizen-
ship. Their presence would thus not be a 
challenge to the character of the Israeli 
state. In parallel, Israeli settlers could live 
in the West Bank under Palestinian sover-
eignty. 
In November 2014, the Israeli-Palestin-
ian non-governmental organisation IPCRI 
(Israel-Palestine: Creative Regional Initia-
tives) presented the most comprehensive 
plan yet for a confederation. It was elabo-
rated with the participation of Israeli and 
Palestinian representatives from the politi-
cal sphere, academia and civil society, and 
provided for the creation of two independ-
ent, sovereign and democratic states on the 
basis of the 1967 borders. The two states 
would form a political and economic union, 
with joint economic and social institutions 
and a High Court for Human Rights. Bor-
ders between the two states would be open; 
and their citizens would enjoy freedom of 
movement and, eventually, freedom of resi-
dence as well. Jerusalem would be an open 
city, and the capital of both states. This 
would solve three crucial problems: first, 
Jerusalem would not be divided; second, 
Palestinian refugees would be allowed to 
return; and third, Jewish settlements in the 
West Bank would not have to be evacuated. 
A further innovative approach is the 
project intiatied by the Swedish diplomat 
Mathias Mossberg in 2008. The project pro-
posed a model of “parallel states”, both of 
which would extend over the entire terri-
tory of Israel and Palestine. Sovereignty 
over this area would be divided, and pri-
marily be defined not along territorial lines 
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but based on citizenship. In this way, Israel 
could keep both its Jewish and largely demo-
cratic character as well as its settlements. 
At the same time, a Palestinian State could 
be founded and Palestinian refugees be 
given the right of return to this state. Some 
tasks would be carried out jointly by the 
institutions of the two states, others sepa-
rately by each state. There would be a per-
manent mechanism for solving disputes 
and problems. Economically, the two states 
would enter into a union. Legally, each 
state would be responsible for its respective 
population, but there would also be areas 
of joint or harmonized jurisdiction. 
Realistic alternatives? 
Given the political realities today, one-state 
models do not offer a viable approach to 
the conflict. Implementing the Israeli right’s 
one-state proposals would merely cement 
existing power relations and ignore the 
Palestinians’ right to self-determination – 
and would thus not bring about peace. One-
state approaches based on equality and 
agreement face several obstacles: the domi-
nance of nationalism in both societies; the 
existence of irreconcilable identities; and 
the profound mistrust between the two 
sides. They would therefore need to be 
preceded by a paradigm change in Pales-
tinian society, to replace the struggle for 
national self-determination with one for 
equal rights. From a Jewish-Israeli perspec-
tive, a one-state solution based on equal 
rights runs counter to political Zionism, 
which enjoys nearly unanimous support 
among Jewish Israelis. It remains especially 
unclear how Jewish Israelis would be per-
suaded – against a background of historical 
persecution and a dwindling demographic 
majority – to give up the status quo, in-
cluding vested rights and privileges, for an 
experiment with uncertain outcomes. This 
is true regardless of the fact that propo-
nents of a one-state approach such as Abu-
nimah do provide for political mechanisms 
that would ensure a balanced representa-
tion in political institutions, and suggest 
forms of government that guarantee collec-
tive cultural and political rights – for in-
stance, by introducing a federal system with 
extensive autonomy for the federal states. 
Accordingly, clear majorities of both popu-
lations have rejected one-state approaches. 
According to a September 2015 poll by the 
Israel Democracy Institute, around 36 per-
cent of Jewish Israelis agree with annexing 
the West Bank, but almost 60 percent are 
against granting full civil rights to the Pales-
tinian population of the annexed areas. In 
June 2013, a joint poll by the PCPSR and 
the Truman Institute found that about two-
thirds of the Palestinian as well as the 
Israeli population rejected a one-state settle-
ment with equal rights for Jews and Arabs. 
In contrast, confederate models offer a 
compromise that might make it possible to 
preserve national identities and collective 
rights, and to simultaneously open up paths 
of cooperation. Yet confederate models – 
regardless of whether they relate exclusive-
ly to Israel-Palestine or to the neighbouring 
states as well – are ultimately based on two 
states. In that sense, they are faced with the 
same obstacles to implementation as con-
ventional two-state approaches – at least for 
as long as sovereignty and territoriality 
remain intertwined. 
Conclusions 
A two-state settlement to the Israeli-Pales-
tinian conflict is the central point of refer-
ence of international politics. German and 
European policies should actively counter 
the dwindling chances of such an approach 
being realized and the consolidation of the 
one-state reality. That would be crucial to 
prevent the continuation and entrench-
ment of the unlawful situation linked to 
the occupation, which is about to celebrate 
its fiftieth anniversary. In that context, it is 
also useful to discuss alternative solutions 
and sound out to what extent their creative 
elements could contribute to overcoming 
obstacles to conflict resolution. 
Yet the main problem is not the sub-
stance of a two-state settlement, but the 
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lack of political will for realizing any settle-
ment, whatever its details, and for making 
the necessary compromises. The question 
that must be prioritized by German and 
European politics is therefore how to gen-
erate the necessary political will on the part 
of the parties to the conflict, instead of 
merely referring, mantra-like, to a two-state 
settlement. Current approaches – such as 
the initiative for an international Middle 
East conference being promoted by France, 
or a report to be published by the Middle 
East Quartet (representing the USA, Russia, 
the UN and the EU) with recommendations 
for solving the conflict – might well be first 
steps towards changing the cost-benefit 
analyses of the political elites, but they are 
unlikely to suffice. Concrete and binding 
measures will also be required: parameters 
for a negotiated settlement stipulated by 
the Security Council; a robust mediation; a 
readiness to back the implementation of 
any deal with substantial security guaran-
tees and a security presence; but also spell-
ing out concrete sanctions in case of non-
cooperation. 
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